We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum Markov games in which the two players simultaneously take actions. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward function and transition kernel possess a linear structure. Both the offline and online settings of the problems are considered. In the offline setting, we control both players and the goal is to find the Nash Equilibrium efficiently by minimizing the worst-case duality gap. In the online setting, we control a single player to play against an arbitrary opponent and the goal is to minimize the regret. For both settings, we propose an optimistic variant of the least-squares minimax value iteration algorithm. We show that our algorithm is computationally efficient and provably achieves an O( √ d 3 H 3 T) upper bound on the duality gap and regret, without requiring additional assumptions on the sampling model.
Introduction
Reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 2018) is typically modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) (Puterman, 2014) , where an agent aims to learn the optimal decision-making rule via interaction with the environment. In Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), several agents interact with each other and with the underlying environment, and their goal is to optimize their individual returns. This problem is often formulated under the framework of Markov games (Shapley, 1953) , which is a generalization of the MDP model. Powered by function approximation techniques such as deep neural networks (LeCun et al., 2015; Goodfellow et al., 2016) , MARL has recently enjoyed tremendous empirical success across a variety of real-world applications. A partial list of such applications includes the game of Go (Silver et al., 2016 (Silver et al., , 2017 , real-time strategy games (OpenAI, 2018; Vinyals et al., 2019) , Texas Hold'em poker (Moravčík et al., 2017; Sandholm, 2018, 2019) , autonomous driving (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2016) , and learning communication and emergent behaviors (Foerster et al., 2016; Lowe et al., 2017; Bansal et al., 2017; Jaques et al., 2018; Baker et al., 2019) ; see the surveys in Busoniu et al. (2008) ; Zhang et al. (2019) .
In contrast to the vibrant empirical study, theoretical understanding of MARL is relatively inadequate. Most existing work on Markov games assumes access to either a sampling oracle or a well-explored behavioral policy, which fails to capture the exploration-exploitation tradeoff that is fundamental in real-world applications of reinforcement learning. Moreover, these results mostly focus on the relatively simple turn-based setting. An exception is the work in Wei et al. (2017) , which extends the UCRL2 algorithm (Jaksch et al., 2010) for MDP to zero-sum simultaneous-move Markov games. However, their approach explicitly estimates the transition model and thus only works in the tabular setting. Problems with complicated state spaces and transitions necessitate the use of function approximation architectures. In this regard, a fundamental question is left open:
Can we design a provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithm for Markov games under the function approximation setting?
In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to this question for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves. In particular, we study an episodic setting, where each episode consists of H timesteps and the players act simultaneously at each timestep. Upon reaching the H-th timestep, the episode terminates and players replay the game again by starting a new episode. Here, the players have no knowledge of the system model (i.e., the transition kernel) nor access to a sampling oracle that returns the next state for an arbitrary state-action pair. Therefore, the players have to learn the system from data by playing the game sequentially through each episode and repeatedly for multiple episodes. More specifically, we study episodic Markov games under both the offline and online settings. In the offline setting, both players are controlled by a central learner, and the goal is to find an approximate Nash Equilibrium of the game, with the approximation error measured by a notion of duality gap. In the online setting, we control one of the players and play against an opponent who implements an arbitrary policy. Our goal is to minimize the total regret, defined as the difference between the cumulative return of the controlled player and its optimal achievable return when the opponent plays the best response policy. Both settings are generalizations of the regret minimization problem for MDPs.
Furthermore, to incorporate function approximation, we consider Markov games with a linear structure, motivated by the linear MDP model recently studied in . In particular, we assume that both the transition kernel and the reward admit a d-dimensional linear representation with respect to a known feature mapping, which can be potentially nonlinear in its inputs. For both the online and offline settings, we propose the first provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithm without additional assumptions on the sampling model. Our algorithm is an Optimistic version of Minimax Value Iteration (OMNI-VI) with least squares estimation-a modelfree approach-which constructs upper confidence bounds of the optimal action-value function to promote exploration. We show that the OMNI-VI algorithm is computationally efficient, and it provably achieves an O( √ d 3 H 3 T) regret in the online setting and a similar duality gap guarantee in the offline setting, where O omits logarithmic terms. Note that the bounds do not depend on the cardinalities of the state and action spaces, which can be very large or even infinite. When specialized to MDPs, our results recover the regret bounds established in and are thus near-optimal.
We emphasize that the Markov game model poses several new and fundamental challenges that are absent in MDPs and arise due to subtle game-theoretic considerations. Addressing these challenges require several new ideas, which we summarize as follows.
1. Optimism via General-Sum Games. In the offline simultaneous-move setting, implementing the optimism principle for both players amounts to constructing both upper and lower confidence bounds (UCB and LCB) for the optimal value function of the game. Doing so requires one to find, as an algorithmic subroutine, the solution of a general-sum (matrix) game where the two players' payoff functions correspond to the upper and lower bounds for the action-value (or Q) functions of the original Markov game, even though the latter is zerosum to begin with. This stands in sharp contrast of turn-based games (Hansen et al., 2013; Jia et al., 2019; Sidford et al., 2019) , in which each turn only involves constructing an UCB for one player.
2. Using Correlated Equilibrium. Finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) of a general-sum matrix game, however, is computationally hard in general (Daskalakis et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009) . Our second critical observation is that it suffices to find a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) (Moulin and Vial, 1978; Aumann, 1987) of the game. Originally developed in algorithmic game theory, CCE is a tractable notion of equilibrium that strictly generalizes NE. In contrast to NE, a CCE can be found efficiently in polynomial time even for general-sum games (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008; Blum et al., 2008) . Moreover, our analysis shows that using any CCE of the matrix general-sum game are sufficient for ensuring optimism for the original Markov game. Thus, by using CCE instead of NE, we achieve efficient exploration-exploitation balance while preserving computational tractability.
Concentration and Game Stability.
The last challenge is more technical, arising in the analysis of the algorithm where we need to establish certain uniform concentration bounds for the CCEs. As we elaborate later, the CCEs of a general-sum game are unstable (i.e., not Lipschitz) with respect to the payoff matrices. Therefore, standard approaches for proving uniform concentration, such as those based on covering/ǫ-net arguments, fail fundamentally. We overcome this issue by carefully stabilizing the algorithm, for which we make use of an ǫ-net in the algorithm. Moreover, we show that this can be done in a computationally efficient way.
We shall discuss the above challenges and ideas in greater details when we formally describe our algorithms. We note that our regret and duality gap bounds also imply polynomial sample complexity (or PAC) guarantees for learning the NEs of simultaneous-move Markov games. Moreover, as turn-based games can be viewed as a special case of simultaneous games, where at each state the reward and transition kernel only depend on the action of one of the players, our algorithms and guarantees readily apply to the turn-based setting. To our best knowledge, our algorithm is the first provably efficient method for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves under the function approximation setting.
Related Work
There is a large body of literature on applying reinforcement learning methods to stochastic games. In particular, under the tabular setting, the work in Littman (1994 Littman ( , 2001a ; Greenwald et al. (2003) ; Hu and Wellman (2003) ; Grau-Moya et al. (2018) extends the Q-learning algorithm (Watkins and Dayan, 1992) to zero-sum and general-sum Markov games, and that in Perolat et al. (2018) ; Srinivasan et al. (2018) extends the actor-critic algorithm (Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000) . Most of their convergence guarantees are asymptotic and rely on access to a sampling oracle. Particularly related to us is the work in Sidford et al. (2019) , which proposes a variance-reduced variant of the minimax Q-learning algorithm with near-optimal sample complexity. We note that the theoretical results therein also require a sampling oracle, and they focus on turn-based games, a special case of simultaneous-move games. The work in Lagoudakis and Parr (2012) ; Perolat et al. (2015) ; Pérolat et al. (2016b,a,c) ; Yang et al. (2019) considers function approximation techniques applied to variants of value-iteration methods and establishes finite-time convergence to the NEs of twoplayer zero-sum Markov games. Their results are based on the framework of fitted value-iteration (Munos and Szepesvári, 2008) and the availability of a well-explored behavioral policy. In a recent work, Jia et al. (2019) studies turn-based zero-sum Markov games, where the transition model is assumed to be embedded in some d-dimensional feature space, extending the MDP model proposed by Yang and Wang (2019b) . Assuming a sampling oracle, they propose a variant of Q-learning algorithm that is guaranteed to find an ε-optimal strategy using O(dε −2 (1 − γ) −4 ) samples, where γ is a discount factor. In summary, all of the work above either assume a sampling oracle or a well explored behavioral policy for drawing transitions, therefore effectively bypassing the exploration issue.
Our work builds on a line of research on provably efficient methods for MDPs without additional assumptions on the sampling model. Most of the existing work focus on the tabular setting; see e.g., Strehl et al. (2006); Jaksch et al. (2010) ; Osband et al. (2014) ; Osband and Van Roy (2016) ; Azar et al. (2017) ; Dann et al. (2017) ; Agrawal and Jia (2017) ; Jin et al. (2018) ; Russo (2019) ; Rosenberg and Mansour (2019a,b); Jin and Luo (2019) ; Zanette and Brunskill (2019) ; Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019) ; Dong et al. (2019b) and the references therein. Under the function approximation setting, sample-efficient algorithms have been proposed using linear function approximators (Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2019a,b; Yang and Wang, 2019a; Du et al., 2019b; Cai et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019) , as well as nonlinear ones (Wen and Van Roy, 2017; Jiang et al., 2017; Dann et al., 2018; Du et al., 2019b; Dong et al., 2019a; Du et al., 2019a) . Among these results, our work is most related to ; ; Cai et al. (2019) , which consider linear MDP models and propose optimistic and randomized variants of least-squares value iteration (LSVI) (Bradtke and Barto, 1996; Osband et al., 2014) as well as optimistic variants of proximal policy optimization (Schulman et al., 2017) . Our linear Markov game model generalizes the MDP model considered in these papers, and our OMNI-VI algorithm can be viewed as a generalization of the optimistic LSVI method proposed in . As mentioned before, the game structures in our problem pose fundamental challenges that are absent in MDPs, and thus their algorithms cannot be trivially extended to our game setting.
Finally, we remark that work on provably sample efficient RL methods for Markov games is quite scarce. The only comparable work we are aware of is Wei et al. (2017) , which proposes a model-based algorithm that extends the UCRL2 algorithm (Jaksch et al., 2010) for tabular MDPs to the game setting. Similarly to their work, we also consider both the online and offline settings and provide guarantees in terms of duality gap and regret. On the other hand, they only consider tabular setting, which is a special case of our linear model. Moreover, their model-based algorithm explicitly estimates the Markov transition kernel and relies on the complicated technique of Extended Value Iteration, whose computational cost is quite high as it requires augmenting the state/action spaces. In comparison, our algorithm is model-free in the sense that it directly estimates the value functions; moreover, the computational cost of our algorithm only depends on the dimension d of the feature and not the cardinality of the state space.
Background and Preliminaries
In this section, we formally describe the setup for episodic two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves, and introduce relevant definitions and notations. We then describe the setting for turn-based games, which can be viewed as a special case of simultaneous-moves games.
Simultaneous-Move Markov Games
Denote the two players as P1 and P2. A two-player, zero-sum, simultaneous-moves, episodic Markov game is defined by the tuple
where S is the state space, A i is a finite set of actions player i ∈ {1, 2} can take, r is reward function, P is transition kernel and H is the number of steps in each episode. At each step h ∈ [H], upon observing the state x, P1 and P2 take actions a ∈ A 1 and b ∈ A 2 , respectively, and then both receive the reward r h (x, a, b). The system then transitions to a new state x ′ ∼ P h (·|x, a, b) according to the transition kernel. Throughout this paper, we assume that A 1 = A 2 =: A for simplicity-generalization to the setting with A 1 = A 2 is straightforward. We also assume that the rewards r h (x, a, b) are deterministic functions taking value in [−1, 1].
Denote by ∆ ≡ ∆(A) the probability simplex over the action space A. A stochastic policy of P1 is a sequence of H functions denoted by π := (π h : S → ∆) h∈ [H] . At each step h ∈ [H] and state x ∈ S, P1 takes an action sampled from the distribution π h (x) over A. Similarly, a stochastic policy of P2 is given by the sequence ν := (ν h : S → ∆) h∈ [H] .
Value Functions
For a fixed pair of policies (π, ν) for both players, the value and Q functions for the above game can be defined in a manner analogous to the episodic Markov decision process (MDP) setting:
Under the boundedness assumption on the reward, it is easy see that all value functions are bounded:
In the zero-sum setting, for a given initial state x 1 , P1 aims to maximize V π,ν 1 (x 1 ) whereas P2 aims to minimize it. Accordingly, we introduce the value and Q (a.k.a. action-value) functions when P1 plays the best response to a fixed policy ν of P2:
Analogously, when P2 plays the best response to P1's policy π, we define
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game is a pair of stochastic policies (π * , ν * ) that are the best response to each other; that is,
We assume that the game satisfies appropriate regularity conditions so that a NE exists and their values are unique. 1 
Define the following shorthand for conditional expectation for the step-h transition:
While not explicitly needed in our analysis, we note that the value/Q functions for the NE satisfy the Bellman equation
The fixed-policy and best-response value/Q functions, V π,ν h , V π, * h , V * ,ν h , Q π,ν h , Q π, * h and Q * ,ν h , satisfy a similar set of Bellman equations; we omit the details.
The following weak duality result, which follows immediately from definition, relates the above value and Q functions.
Proposition 1 (Weak duality). For each policy pair (π, ν) and each h ∈ [H], (x, a, b) 
Linear Structures
We assume that both the reward function and transition kernel have a linear structure.
Assumption 1 (Linearity and Boundedness). For each (x, a, b) 
The above assumption implies that the Q functions are linear.
Lemma 1 (Linearity of value function). Under Assumption 1, for any policy pair (π, ν) and any h ∈ [H], there exists a vector w π,ν h ∈ R d such that
Proof. By Bellman equation and linearity of r h and P h , we have
The linear setting above covers the tabular setting as a special case, where d = |S| · |A| 2 and φ(x, a, b) is the indicator vector for the tuple (x, a, b) . It is also clear that MDPs are a special case of Markov games when P2 plays a fixed and known policy. In particular, our setting covers both tabular MDPs as well as the linear MDP setting considered in . Finally, as we elaborate below, turn-based Markov Games can also be viewed as a special case of our setting.
Turn-Based Markov games
In turn-based games, at each state only one player takes an action. Without loss of generality, we may partition the state space as S = S 1 ∪ S 2 , where S i are the states at which it is player i's turn to play. 2 For each state x ∈ S, let I(x) ∈ {1, 2} indicate the current player to play so that we have x ∈ S I(x) . At each step h ∈ [H], player I(x) observes the current state x and takes an action a; then the two players receive the reward r h (x, a), and the system transitions to a new state
etc., as well as the corresponding NE of the game, can be defined in a completely analogous way as in the simultaneous-move setting. Similarly to Assumption 1, we also assume that the game has a linear structure.
Assumption 2 (Linearity and Boundedness, Turn-Based). For each (x, a) ∈ S × A and h ∈ [H], we have
One can view a turn-based Markov game as a special case of a simultaneous-move Markov game, where at each state only one of the players is "active" and the other player's action has no influence on the reward or the transition. Formally, for each x ∈ S 1 , the values of the functions r h (x, a, b), P h (·|x, a, b) and φ(x, a, b) are independent of b; for each x ∈ S 2 , they are independent of a.
Notation
If x ≥ Cy holds for a universal absolute constant C > 0, we write x y, x = Ω(y) and y = O(x). For each real number u, define the clipping operation Π H (u) = max {min {u, H} , −H}. We use · to denote the vector ℓ 2 norm and · F the matrix Frobenius norm. For each positive semidefinite matrix A, define the weighted ℓ 2 norm v A := √ v ⊤ Av for the vector v. We sometimes need to consider a general-sum matrix (or normal form) game with payoff matrices u i ∈ R |A|×|A| for each player i ∈ {1, 2}. Here, if P1 and P2 take actions a and b, respectively, then player i receives a payoff u i (a, b) . As before, we use the convention that P1 tries to maximize the payoff and P2 tries to minimize. A joint distribution σ ∈ ∆(A × A) of both players' actions is called a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (Moulin and Vial, 1978; Aumann, 1987) of the game if it satisfies
That is, in a CCE the players choose their actions in a potentially correlated way such that no unilateral (unconditional) deviation from σ is beneficial. Note that a CCE σ = σ 1 × σ 2 in product-form is an NE.
Main Results for the Offline Setting
In this section, we consider the offline setting, where a central controller controls both players. The goal of the controller is learn a Nash equilibrium (π * , ν * ) of the game in episodic setting. In what follows, we formally define the problem setup and objectives, and then present our algorithm and provide theoretic guarantees for its performance.
Setup and Performance Metrics
In the episodic setting, the Markov game is played for K episodes, each of which consists of H timesteps. At the beginning of the k-th episode, an arbitrary initial state x k 1 is chosen, possibly by an adversary. Then the players P1 and P2 play according to the policies π k = (π k h ) h∈ [H] and ν k = (ν k h ) h∈ [H] , respectively, which may adapt to observations from past episodes. The game terminates after H timesteps and restarts for the (k + 1)-th episode. Note that expected reward for P1 and P2 in the k-th episode is V π k ,ν k 1 (x 1 ).
Duality gap guarantees:
Recall the weak duality property in Proposition 1, which says the value of the NE, V * 1 (x 1 ), is sandwiched between V π k , * policy. Then the total duality gap can be written equivalently as
which is the sum of the exploitability of both players accumulated over K episodes. Also note that in special cases of MDPs, Gap(K) reduces to the usual notion of expected total regret.
Sample complexity (PAC) guarantees:
Another performance metric is the sample complexity for finding an approximate NE. In particular, suppose that for all episodes the initial states x 1 are sampled from the same fixed distribution. We are interested in the number of episodes K (or equivalently the number of samples T = KH) needed to find a policy pair (π, ν) satisfying
Note that in light of Proposition 1, the above inequality implies that (π, ν) is an ǫ-approximate NE in the sense that
that is, (π, ν) satisfies the definition (1) of NE up to an ǫ error. As we will discuss in details after presenting our main theorem, a bound on the total duality gap implies a bound on the sample complexity.
Algorithm
We now present our algorithm, Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration (OMNI-VI) with least squares estimation, which is given as Algorithm 1. In each episode k, the algorithm involves first constructing the policies for both players (lines 3-12), and then executing the policy to play the game (lines 13-17). The construction of the policy is done through backward induction in the timestep h.
In each time step, we first compute upper/lower estimates w h , w h ∈ R d of the linear coefficients of the Q-function. This is done by approximately solving the Bellman equation (2) using (regularized) least-squares estimation, for which we use empirical data from the previous k − 1 episodes to estimate the unknown transition kernel P h (lines 4-6). Then, to encourage exploration, we construct UCB/LCB for the Q function by adding/subtracting an appropriate bonus term (lines 7-8).
The bonus takes the form β φ ⊤ (Λ k h ) −1 φ, which is common in the literature of linear bandits (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018). The next and crucial step, which we elaborate on below, is to convert these bounds into UCB/LCB for the value function (lines 9-11).
Algorithm 1 Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration (Simultaneous Move, Offline)
1: for episode k = 1, 2, . . . , K do 2:
Receive initial state x k 1 3: 
15:
P1 takes action a k h ; P2 takes action b k h .
16:
Observe next state x k h+1 .
17:
end for 18: end for Note that the UCB/LCB V h (x) and V h (x) for the value functions must correspond to the actions (a ′ , b ′ ) that would be actually played at state x, i.e., V h (x) = Q h (x, a ′ , b ′ ) (in expectation w.r.t. randomness of the stochastic policy; similarly for V h (x)), so that the upper/lower bounds can be tightened up using empirical observations from these actions. To construct these bounds, one may be tempted to let each player independently compute the maximin or minimax values and actions. That is, one may let P1 play the action
Instead, we must coordinate both players for their choices of actions, which is done by solving the general-sum matrix game with payoff matrices Q k h (x, ·, ·) and Q k h (x, ·, ·). As computing the NE for general-sum games is intractable, we find an (approximate) CCE of the matrix game instead. For technical reasons discussed in the Introduction (and further elaborated in the next paragraph), the subroutine FIND_CCE for finding the CCE is implemented in a specific way as follows. Let Q be the class of functions Q : S × A × A → R with the parametric form
where the parameters (w,
these notations, we present the subroutine FIND_CCE in Algorithm 2. The algorithm finds, as an surrogate of the CCE of the game Q k h (x, ·, ·), Q k h (x, ·, ·) of interest, the CCE of a nearby game in the finite ǫ-cover Q ǫ × Q ǫ .
Algorithm 2 FIND_CCE
3: For the input x, let σ(x) be the CCE (cf. equation (3)) of the matrix game with payoff matrices Q(x, ·, ·) for P1 and Q (x, ·, ·) for P2. ; nevertheless, we can make the approximation error sufficiently small by choosing a small enough ǫ.
Theoretical Guarantees
In each episode k, Algorithm 2 computes a joint (correlated) policy σ k h . As NE requires the policies to be in product form, we marginalize σ k h into a pair of independent policies π k h (x) := P 1 σ k h (x) and ν k h (x) := P 2 σ k h (x) for each player. Our main theoretical result is the following bound on the total duality gap (4) of these policy pairs. Recall that T = KH is the total number of timesteps.
Theorem 1 (Offline, Simultaneous Moves). Under Assumption 1, there exists a constant c > 0 such that the following holds for each fixed p ∈ (0, 1). Set β = cdH √ ι with ι := log(2dT/p) in Algorithm 1, and set ǫ = 1 KH in Algorithm 2. Then with probability at least 1 − p, Algorithm 1 satisfies bound
The proof is given in Section 5. Below we provide discussion and remarks on this theorem.
3 It is worth noticing that this issue does not exist in the tabular setting, as each (V k h , V k h ) is just a pair of finitedimensional vectors and one can directly build an ǫ-cover of the relevant set of vectors.
Optimality of the bound:
The theorem provides an (instance-independent) bound scaling with √ T. As the total duality gap reduces to the usual regret in the special case of MDPs, our bound is optimal in T in view of known minimax lower bounds for MDPs (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018) . Also note that our bound is independent of cardinality |S| · |A| of the state/action spaces, but rather depends only on dimension d of the feature space, thanks to the use of function approximation. To investigate the tightness of the dependence of our bound on d and H, we recall that our setting covers the standard tabular MDPs and linear bandits as special cases. A direct reduction from the known lower bounds on tabular MDPs gives a lower bound Ω( √ dH 2 T) for the case of nonstationary transitions (Jin et al., 2018; Azar et al., 2017) . Our bound is off by a factor of √ H, which may be improved by using a "Bernstein-type" bonus term (Azar et al., 2017; Jin et al., 2018) . Results from linear bandits give the lower bound Ω(d √ T). The additional √ d factor in our bound is due to a covering argument applied to the d-dimensional feature space for establishing uniform concentration bounds.
Computational complexity:
Our algorithm can be implemented efficiently, with a computational complexity polynomial in H, K, d and |A|. In particular, note that a CCE of a general-sum game can be found in polynomial time (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008) . 4 Moreover, in Algorithm 1 we do not need to compute Q(x, ·, ·), V(x) and σ(x) etc. for all x ∈ S; rather, we only need to do so for the states {x k h } actually encountered in the algorithm. Similarly, we do not need to explicitly maintain the (exponentially large) ǫ-net Q ǫ in FIND_CCE (Algorithm 2). It suffices if we can find an element in Q ǫ that is ǫ-close to a given function in Q, which can be done efficiently on the fly. Indeed, each function in Q has a succinct representation using (w, A) ∈ R d × R d×d , so we only need to (implicitly) maintain a covering of the space of (w, A) and find a nearby element from this covering when needed; see Appendix E for details.
Sample complexity guarantees:
It is a standard fact that the above regret bound can be converted into a (PAC) bound on the sample complexity. For simplicity we assume that the initial state x 1 is fixed. 5 After K episodes, we may let (π, ν) be a random policy pair chosen with probabilities P (π, ν) = (π k , ν k ) = 1 K , k ∈ [K]. Dividing the regret bound in Theorem 1 by K = T/H gives 1
It then follows from Markov's inequality that with probability at least 1 − δ:
Therefore, we can find an ǫ-approximate NE (meaning that the last RHS is bounded by ǫ) with a sample complexity of
Turn-Based Games
In this section, we consider turn-based Markov games, which is a special case of simultaneousmove Markov games. Algorithm 1 can be specialized to this setting. For completeness, we provide the resulting algorithm in Algorithm 4 in Appendix A. Note that for turn-based games, the FIND_CCE routine is simplified to the subroutines FIND_MAX and FIND_MIN given in Algorithm 5, because each state is controlled by a single player and hence finding a CCE reduces to computing a maximizer or minimizer. As a corollary of Theorem 1, we have the following bound on the total duality gap, which is defined in the same way as in (4). We prove this bound in Appendix D.
Corollary 1 (Offline, Turn-based). Under Assumption 2, there exists a constant c > 0 such that, for each fixed p ∈ (0, 1), by setting β = cdH √ ι with ι := log(2dT/p) in Algorithm 4, then with probability at least 1 − p, Algorithm 4 satisfies bound
Main Results for the Online Setting
In this section, we consider the online setting, where we control P1 and play against an arbitrary (and potentially adversarial) P2. Our goal is to maximize the reward of P1. Below we describe the performance metrics, followed by our algorithms and theoretical guarantees.
Setup and Performance Metrics
We consider the episodic setting as described in Section 3.1. Let π = (π k ) and ν = (ν k ) be the policy sequences for P1 and P2, respectively, where ν is arbitrary. We do not know P2's choice of ν nor the Markov model of the game a priori, and would like learn a good policy π online so as to optimize the reward ∑ k V π k ,ν k 1 received by P1 over K episodes. To this end, we are interested in bounding, for each ν, the total (expected) regret
where x k 1 is the (arbitrary) initial state in the k-th episode. If we can obtain a bound on Regret ν (K) that scales sublinearly with K for all ν, then we are guaranteed that regardless of ν, the reward collected by P1 is no worse (in the long run) than its optimal worst-case reward, that is, the NE value V * 1 . We note that a special case of the above setting is when P2 is omniscient and always plays the best response to P1's policy, i.e.,
Note that in this case, we have V π k ,ν k 1 (x k 1 ) = V π k , * 1 (x k 1 ) by definition.
Algorithm
We adapt the Optimistic Minimax Value Iteration algorithm to the online setting, as given in Algorithm 3. This algorithm can be viewed as a one-sided version of Algorithm 1: we compute least-squares estimate for the linear coefficients and then construct UCBs for the value functionswe do not need to construct LCBs as P2 is not controlled by us. Constructing the UCBs is done by finding the NE of the zero-sum matrix game with the payoff matrix Q k h (x, ·, ·). Recalling the definition of NE, we see that the pair (π k h (x), B 0 ) ∈ ∆ × ∆ computed in the algorithm satisfies
for each x ∈ S. 
For each x, let (π k h (x), B 0 ) be the NE of the matrix game with payoff matrix Q k h (x, ·, ·).
8: P1 take action a k h ∼ π k h (x k h ).
12:
Let P2 play; denote its action by b k h .
13:
14:
end for 15: end for Due to the one-sided nature of the online setting, some of the difficulties in the offline settingpertaining to general-sum games and CCE-no longer exist here. In particular, Algorithm 3 no longer requires the FIND_CCE subroutine that makes use of an ǫ-net. Technically, this is due to the fact that zero-sum games are more well-behaved than general-sum games. In particular, a zerosum game is Lipschitz in the payoff matrix, hence uniform concentration can be established in a more straightforward manner (cf. the discussion in Section 3.2).
Regret Bound Guarantees
We establish the following bound on the total regret (6) achieved by Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2 (Online, Simultaneous Move). Under Assumption 1, there exists a constant c > 0 such that the following holds for each fixed p ∈ (0, 1) and any policy sequence ν for P2. Set β = cdH √ ι with ι := log(2dT/p). Then with probability at least 1 − p, Algorithm 3 achieves the regret bound
The proof is given in Appendix C. Note that the regret bound holds for any policy ν of P2 and any initial states {x k 1 }. Moreover, the bound is sublinear in T-scaling with √ T in particularand depends polynomially on d and H. As our regret reduces to the standard regret notion in the special cases of MDPs and linear bandits, the discussion in Section 3.2 on the optimality of bounds, also applies here.
Turn-Based Games
The algorithm above can be specialized to the special case of online turn-based games. For completeness we provide resulting algorithm in Appendix A as Algorithm 6. Note that in the turnbased setting, we only need to solve a unilateral maximization or minimization problem, rather than solving zero-sum games as is needed in the simultaneous-move setting.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 2, we have the following regret bound for turn-based games in the online setting. We prove this bound in Appendix D.
Corollary 2 (Online, Turn-based). Under Assumption 2, there exists a constant c > 0 such that the following holds for each fixed p ∈ (0, 1) and any policy sequence ν for P2. Set β = cdH √ ι with ι := log(2dT/p) in Algorithm 6. Then with probability at least 1 − p, Algorithm 6 achieves the regret bound
Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 for the online setting of simultaneous games. We shall make use of the technical lemmas given in Appendix B. For ease of exposition, we denote by φ k h := φ(x k h , a k h , b k h ) the feature vector encountered in the h-th step of the k-th episode. Our proof consists of five steps: 
Establishing final bound:
Bounding each term in the above recursive decomposition in terms of the least-squares estimation errors, we establish the desired bound on the total duality gap and thereby completing the proof of the theorem. See Section 5.5.
Below we provide the details of each step.
Uniform Concentration
The quantity ∑ τ∈ [k−1] 
can be viewed as an empirical estimate of the unknown population quantity ∑ τ∈ [k−1] 
To control the least-squares estimation error, we need to show that the empirical estimate concentrates around its population counterpart. The main challenge in doing so is that V k h+1 is constructed using data from previous episodes and hence depends on φ τ h for all τ ∈ [k − 1]. We overcome this issue by noting that V k h+1 is computed using the CCE of a finite class of games with payoff matrices in the ǫ-net Q ǫ × Q ǫ , as is done in FIND_CCE. Therefore, we can prove a concentration bound valid uniformly over this class of games and thereby establish following concentration result. Here we recall that v A := √ v ⊤ Av denotes the weighted ℓ 2 norm of a vector v.
Lemma 2 (Concentration) . Under the setting of Theorem 1, for each p ∈ (0, 1), the following event E holds with probability at least 1 − p/2:
in the sense of equation 3, and set V(x) := E (a,b)∼ σ(x) Q(x, a, b) 
with probability at least 2 −Ω(d 2 log(dT/p)) . Now note that |Q ǫ × Q ǫ | = (N ǫ ) 2 ≤ 4 1 + 8H 
where the last step follows from Λ k h I and φ τ h ≤ 1. Recalling our choice ǫ = 1 KH proves the first inequality in the lemma. The second inequality can be proved in a similar fashion.
Least-squares Estimation Error
Here we bound the difference between the algorithm's action-value functions (without bonus) and the true action-value functions of any policy pair (π, ν), recursively in terms of the step h. (x, a, b, h, k) 
and any policy pair (π, ν):
We only prove the first inequality (8a). The second inequality can be proved in a similar fashion.
By Lemma 1 and Bellman equation we have the equality
for all τ ∈ [k − 1]. Multiplying the above equality by Λ k h −1 φ τ h and summing over τ, we obtain that
where the first equality above holds because ∑ τ∈ [k−1] 
On the other hand, recall that by algorithm specification we have w k
whence for each (x, a, b) :
We apply Cauchy-Schwarz to bound each RHS term:
1. First term: we have
where the last two steps follow from Λ k h I and w π,ν h H √ d (Lemma 7).
Second term: we have
by Lemma 2.
Third term: recalling that
where we use the facts that Λ k
Combining, we obtain
This completes the proof of the inequality (8a) in the lemma.
The above lemma can be specialized to the value functions of the best response (cf. Remark 1); e.g., x, a, b ). We will make use of this bound and its variants in the proofs of our main theorems.
Upper and Lower Confidence Bounds
With the above bounds on the estimation errors, we can show that V k h and V k h constructed in the algorithm are indeed lower and upper bounds for the true value function. To this end, we state a simple lemma first.
Lemma 4 (Algorithm 2 finds 2ǫ-CCE). For each (k, h, x) 
Proof. Let Q, Q be the elements in the ǫ-net that are closest to Q k h , Q k h , as specified in Algorithm 2. This means that Q k h (x, a, b) − Q(x, a, b) ≤ ǫ and Q k h (x, a, b) − Q (x, a, b) ≤ ǫ for all (x, a, b) . Fix an arbitrary x ∈ S. Because σ k h (x) = σ(x) is an CCE of Q(x, ·, ·), Q (x, ·, ·) , we have for all a ′ ∈ A:
This proves the first inequality in the lemma. The second inequality can be proved in a similar fashion.
We can now establish the UCB and LCB properties.
Lemma 5 (UCB and LCB). Under the setting of Theorem 1, on the event E in Lemma 2, we have for each (x, a, b, k, h) :
Proof. The inequalities (b) and (ii) follow from Proposition 1. Below we only prove the upper bounds (c) and (iii). The lower bounds (a) and (i) can be proved in a similar fashion. We fix k and perform induction on h. The base case h = H + 1 holds since the terminal cost is zero. Now assume that the bounds (c) and (iii) hold for step h + 1; that is, x, a, b) . By inequality (8a) in Lemma 3 applied to ( π, ν k ) with π being the best response to ν k , we have for each (x, a, b) :
Under the induction hypothesis, we obtain
We can now lower-bound Q k h (x, a, b):
This proves the inequality (c) for step h. Finally, recall that ν k h (x) := P 2 σ k h (x), and let br(ν k h (x)) denote the best response to ν k h (x) with respect to Q * ,ν k h (x, ·, ·); i.e.,
We then have for all x:
This proves inequality (iii) for step h.
Recursive Decomposition of Duality Gap
Thanks to Lemma 5 established above, the difference of the UCB and LCB, namely
. Setting the stage for bounding the duality gap, we show below that δ k h can be decomposed recursively into the sum of δ k h+1 and some error terms. Lemma 6 (Recursive decomposition). Let
. Then on the event E in Lemma 2, we have for all (k, h) , (x, a, b, k, h) , by construction we have (8a) and (8b) in Lemma 3 ensure that
On the other hand, observe that by definition,
Applying the inequality (9), we obtain
as desired.
Establishing Duality Gap Bound
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. First observe that on the event E in Lemma 2 (which holds with probability at least 1 − p/2), we have
• For the first term, we know that (ζ k h + γ k h − γ k h ) is a martingale difference sequence (with respect to both h and k), and ζ k h + γ k h − γ k h ≤ 6H. Hence by Azuma-Hoeffding, we have with probability at least 1 − p/2,
• For the second term, we apply the elliptical potential Lemma 10 to obtain
• For the third term, we have 8KHǫ ≤ 8 by the choice ǫ = 1 KH .
Combining the above inequalities, we obtain that with probability at least 1 − p,
by our choice of β ≍ dH √ ι and the fact that T = KH. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop provably efficient reinforcement learning methods for zero-sum Markov Games with simultaneous moves and a linear structure. To ensure efficient exploration, our algorithms construct appropriate UCB/LCB for both players and make crucial use of the concept of Coarse Correlated Equilibrium. We provide regret bounds under both the offline and online settings. Corollaries of these bounds apply to turn-based games and the tabular settings. Our results build on and generalize work on learning MDPs with linear structures, and at the same time highlight the crucial differences and new challenges in the game setting.
A number of directions are of interest for future research. An immediate step is to investigate whether the dependence on the dimension d and horizon H in our bounds can be improved and what are the optimal scaling. It would also be interesting to improve our online regret bounds so that we can compete with the best response to the opponent (not just competing with the NE). Generalizations to general-sum Markov games, as well as to games with more complicated, nonlinear structures, are also of great interest. 
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The algorithm involves the subroutines FIND_MAX and FIND_MIN, which are derived by specializing the FIND_CCE routine in Algorithm 2 to the turn-based setting. For completeness we provide below a description of these two subroutines. Let Q be the class of functions Q : S × A → R with the parametric form
where the parameter (w, A, ρ) satisfy w ≤ 2H √ dk, A F ≤ β 2 √ d and ρ ∈ {±1}. Let Q ǫ be a fixed ǫ-covering of Q with respect to the ℓ ∞ norm. With these notations, the subroutine FIND_MAX is given in Algorithm 5, and the subroutine FIND_MIN is given by FIND_MIN(Q, x) = FIND_MAX(−Q, x).
3: For the input x, let a = arg max a Q(x, a). 4: Output: a.
Informally, one may simply think of FIND_MAX(Q, x) as arg max a Q(x, a) and FIND_MIN(Q, x) as arg min a Q(x, a) . As in the simultaneous game setting, these subroutines are introduced for technical reasons in the analysis.
A.2 Online Setting
In the online setting, the algorithm for turn-based games is given in Algorithm 6. 
B Technical Lemmas
The proofs of our main Theorems 1 and 2 involve several common steps. We summarize these steps as several lemmas, which are either proved below or are standard in the literature.
B.1 Boundedness of Linear Coefficients
We begin with two simple lemmas about boundedness of the linear coefficients of Q functions.
Lemma 7 (True coefficients are bounded). Under Assumption 1, for each policy pair (π, ν) of P1 and P2, the linear coefficient of their action-value function Q π,ν
Proof. From the Bellman equation, we have
Assuming that {φ(x, a, b)} spans R d and solving the linear equation, we obtain
Under the normalization Assumption 1, we have θ h ≤
thereby proving the last inequality in the lemma.
B.2 Inequalities for Summations
We next state two lemmas for summations. The first lemma is from Jin et al. (2019, Lemma D.1) .
Lemma 9 (Simple upper bound). Lemma 10 (Elliptical potential lemma). Suppose that {φ t } t ≥ 0 is a sequence in R d satisfying φ t ≤ 1, ∀t. Let Λ 0 ∈ R d×d be a positive definite matrix, and
B.3 Covering and Concentration Inequalities for Self-normalized Processes
The first lemma below is useful for establishing uniform concentration. Recall the function class Q defined in the text around equation (5).
Lemma 11 (Covering) . The ǫ-covering number of Q with respect to the ℓ ∞ norm satisfies
Proof. For any two functions Q, Q ′ ∈ Q with parameters (w, A, ρ) and (w ′ , A ′ , ρ), we have
where the second last inequality follows due to the fact that | √ x − √ y| ≤ |x − y| holds for any
x, y ≥ 0. Therefore, a 0-cover C ρ of {±1}, an ǫ/2-cover C w of w ∈ R d : w ≤ 2H √ dk and an ǫ 2 /4cover C A of A ∈ R d×d : A F ≤ β 2 √ d implies an ǫ-cover of Q. It follows that
where the last step follows from standard bounds on the covering number of Euclidean Balls, e.g., Vershynin (2012, Lemma 5.2) .
The next lemma, originally from Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011, Theorem 1) , is now standard in the bandit literature.
Lemma 12 (Concentration for self-normalized processes). Suppose {ǫ t } t≥1 is a scalar stochastic process generating the filtration {F t } t≥0 , and ǫ t |F t−1 is zero mean and σ-subGaussian. Let {φ t } t≥1 be an R d -valued stochastic process with φ t ∈ F t−1 . Suppose Λ 0 ∈ R d×d is positive definite, and Λ t = Λ 0 + ∑ t s=1 φ s φ ⊤ s . Then for each δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ, we have t ∑ s=1 φ s ǫ s 2 Λ −1 t ≤ 2σ 2 log det(Λ t ) 1/2 det(Λ 0 ) −1/2 δ , ∀t ≥ 0.
C Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2 for the online setting of simultaneous games. We shall make use of the technical lemmas given in Appendix B. Recall the shorthand φ k h := φ(x k h , a k h , b k h ). The proof follows a similar strategy as that for the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 5. In particular, our proof consists of five steps as presented in the subsections to follow.
C.1 Uniform Concentration
In the online setting, the value function estimate V k h+1 (x) is computed using the NE of the zero-sum game defined by a single payoff matrix Q k h+1 (x, ·, ·). It is easier to establish uniform concentration in this setting. To see why, we recall the function class Q defined in the text around equation (5) In words, V contains the values of the NEs of the zero-sum games in Q. As we show in the lemma below, an ǫ-cover of the set Q immediately induces an ǫ-cover of the set V, thanks to the nonexpansiveness of the maximin operator for zero-sum games. (Note that general-sum games and their CCEs do not have such a non-expansiveness property in general; see Appendix F for details.)
Lemma 13 (Covering). The ǫ-covering number of V with respect to the ℓ ∞ norm is upper bounded by
Proof. For any two functions V, V ′ ∈ V, let them take the form V(·) = max A∈∆ min B∈∆ E a∈A,b∈B Q(·, a, b) and V ′ (·) = max A∈∆ min B∈∆ E a∈A,b∈B Q ′ (·, a, b) with Q, Q ′ ∈ Q. Since the maximin operator is non-expansive, we have
Therefore, an ǫ-cover of Q induces an ǫ-cover of V, and hence the ǫ-covering number of V is upper bounded by the ǫ-covering number of Q. Recalling that the latter number is bounded in Lemma 11, we complete the proof of the desired bound.
Lemma 14 (Concentration) . Under the setting of Theorem 2, for each p ∈ (0, 1), the following event E holds with probability at least 1 − p/2:
Proof. Let F τ−1 := F (x 1 · , a 1 · , . . . , x τ−1 · , a τ−1 · ). Note that φ τ · , a τ · ∈ F τ−1 . Set ǫ = 1 K and let V ǫ be a minimal ǫ-net of V. Fix a function V ∈ V ǫ . The random variable V(x τ h+1 ) − P h V(x τ h ) | F τ−1 is zero-mean and 2H-bounded. Applying Lemma 12 gives Lemma 16 (UCB). On the event E in Lemma 2, we have for all (x, a, b, k, h) :
Proof. By algorithm specification and the fact that (π k h (x k h ), B 0 ) is the Nash equilibrium of Q k h (x k h , ·, ·), we have
F Stability of the Value of CCE
In the analysis of our algorithms (in particular, in proving uniform concentration in the proof of Theorem 1), we encounter the following question: Is the value of the CCE of a general-sum game stable under perturbation to the payoff matrices? Here we show that the answer is negative in general, by demonstrating a counter example. Specifically, consider a two-player general-sum matrix game, and recall our convention that player 1 tries to maximize and player 2 tries to minimize (see Section 2.3). Let u i : A × A → R be the payoff matrix of player i ∈ {1, 2}, such that player i receives the payoff u i (a, b) when players 1 and 2 take actions a and b, respectively. Let σ ∈ ∆(A × A) be any notion of (coarse) correlated equilibrium that is unique; e.g., the social-optimal or max-entropy CCE. Then the expected payoff of player i is
We are interested in the question: Is (V 1 , V 2 ) ∈ R 2 a Lipschitz function of (u 1 , u 2 ) with respect to the ℓ ∞ norm? That is, does it exist a constant C such that max i∈{1,2}
The answer is no in general. Consider two games with payoff matrix pairs
where ǫ > 0 can be arbitrarily small. Note that the two pairs of payoff matrices (u 1 , u 2 ) and (u ′ 1 , u ′ 2 ) can be made arbitrarily close. Both games have a unique CCE, with values (V 1 (u 1 , u 2 ), V 2 (u 1 , u 2 )) = (1 + ǫ, −1 − ǫ) and V 1 (u ′ 1 , u ′ 2 ), V 2 (u ′ 1 , u ′ 2 ) = (0, 0).
This shows that (V 1 , V 2 ) are not Lipschitz in the payoff matrices. 6
